With the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998 and subsequent democratization, Indonesia's foreign policy underwent major changes. More stakeholders than under Soeharto's New Order regime are now participating in foreign policy-making. Especially under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the country seemed to make democracy promotion a hallmark of its foreign policy. This raises the questions whether and, if, to what extent, Indonesian democratization changed the country's established foreign policy role conceptions, and how much did Indonesia's democratization impact on the democratization of regional governance? The paper seeks to answer these questions by developing a theoretical framework based on a constructivist version of role theory. On the basis of speeches held by Indonesian political leaders in the United Nations General Assembly and major domestic foreign policy pronouncements, it documents changes in Indonesia's foreign policy role concepts. It shows that, indeed, in the Era Reformasi, democracy became a major component in the country's foreign policy role concept, although many elements of the role concept such as development orientation, Third Worldism, peace orientation and a mediator's role remained constant. However, the litmus test for a democracy oriented foreign policy, that is, the democratization of regional governance in Southeast Asia, remains ambiguous and concrete policy initiatives often declaratory.
Introduction
In May 1998 popular protests forced Indonesian President Soeharto to step down after 32 years in power. The subsequent democratization also ushered in significant changes in the country's foreign policy-making process. During Soeharto's authoritarian rule, foreign policy making was virtually a closed shop affair. Foreign policymaking was largely a presidential prerogative, with the military wielding major influence in security affairs. As the military securitized many foreign policy themes, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was relegated to a junior partner, limited to implementing policy decisions made by Soeharto's inner ruling circle. At the time, numerous ambassadorial posts went to active or retired military officers and military personnel seconded to the embassies exerted control over the civilian diplomatic staff (Nabbs-Keller 2013).
The transition to democracy opened up foreign policymaking to a broader audience. Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations explicitly recognized that in a globalized world foreign policy is a multi-stakeholder affair. Subsequently the legislature, the academe, civil society organizations and the press became more vocal voices in the conduct of foreign policy. While Indonesia's foreign policy was largely paralyzed in the first years after regime change due to the fallout from the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998, with economic recovery, the consolidation of Indonesia's democracy and the appointment of Hassan Wirajuda as foreign minister by President Megawati Soekarnoputri, democracy began to play a greater role in Indonesia's foreign policy -both as a process and as a theme. Hassan reformed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dosch 2007; Nabbs-Keller 2013) and from 2004 onward, organized socalled foreign policy breakfast meetings which brought together major foreign policy stakeholders with the declared objective of making foreign policy more participatory than it had previously been. At the same time, especially under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004 Yudhoyono ( -2014 , democracy also became a foreign policy agenda. This raises the questions of whether (and to what extent) Indonesian democratization changed the country's established foreign policy role conceptions, and how far Indonesia's democratization influenced the democratization of ASEAN as a regional organization and the democratization of ASEAN's member countries.
To answer these questions, this paper proceeds in four steps. First, the section following the introduction lays out the theoretical framework which is based on a constructivist variant of role theory. It provides the analytical tools for interpreting Indonesian foreign policy as a reflection of Indonesian identities viewed through the lens of the country's foreign policy elites and as a response to the identities other countries ascribe to Indonesia. The following section then scrutinizes, second, which role democracy has played in the role conceptions propagated by Indonesian governments prior to the end of the New Order regime. This is followed, third, by an examination of the extent to which Indonesia's role perception as an actor in international politics has changed in the Era Reformasi. Crucial in this context is the question of whether and how democracy has become a major part of the country's foreign policy role conception. In the fourth analytical step, I explore how far Indonesia's democratization has influenced governance at the regional and national level. This step seeks to trace rhetoric-action gaps in Indonesia's foreign policy role conceptions and to gauge role enactment and role performance.
A Role Theory Approach to Indonesian Foreign Policy
Theory-guided studies on Indonesian foreign policy are rare. Most studies explicitly or implicitly rely on variants of realism in analyzing Indonesian foreign policy. Role theory ! 1 Jürgen Rüland -Democratizing Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN analyses, which permit the analysis of the historically grounded parameters and principles of Indonesian foreign policy, are virtually absent from the sizeable body of literature on Indonesian foreign policy. Apart from the research question, the subsequent paper thus 1 also explores new terrain in theoretical and methodological terms.
The idea that states view their behavior towards other states through the prism of role conceptions which reflect their material capabilities and ideational foundations, is neither new, nor a peculiarity of Western political thought. Kautilya's Arthasastra, an ancient Indian guide book for rulers, already highlighted six "types" of foreign policy -accommodation, hostility, indifference, attack, protection and double policy. They were linked to certain qualities and capabilities of the rulers and could thus be considered as role conceptions for foreign policies (Modelski 1964: 549-560; Holsti 1970: 247-248; Michael 2013 ).
The origins of modern role theory in foreign policy analysis can be traced back to the early 1970s and the seminal work of Kalevi J. Holsti. In a comparative study of the foreign policy of seventy-one countries, Holsti identified seventeen major roles states pursue in their international interactions (Holsti 1970: 260) . While in general terms a role is a set of norms which is thought to apply to a person occupying a given position (Turner 1956: 316; Holsti 1970: 238; Gaupp 1983 : 21) -for instance, a father, a teacher, a superior or a politicianforeign policy role conceptions were defined by Holsti as the functions that policymakers believe "their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems." They are "their 'image' of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment" (Holsti 1970: 246) . Typical roles states perform are those of balancer, mediator, regional leader, active independent, bridge builder or faithful ally, to name just some of those highlighted by Holsti. Developing Holsti's approach further, Kirste and Maull proposed a constructivist reformulation of role theory, in which they sought to capture the cognitive variables of the foreign policy process: the world views, values, commitments and objectives underlying foreign policymaking. These are derived from a state's self-perceptions and the identities ascribed to this state by other actors in international relations (Kirste & Maull 1996) . Both the domestic role perceptions (ego part) and the perceptions of others (alter part), determine a state's interests and behavior in international relations, although the ego part is usually considered as exerting greater influence on a state's foreign policy than the alter part (Kirste & Maull 1996: 286) . Foreign policy role conceptions are shaped by long-term patterns of attitudes and behavior which reflect the structure of the international system and a state's geographic circumstances, socioeconomic characteristics, political system, capabilities, ideologies and historical experiences as interpreted by its foreign policy elites. It is thus well in line with constructivist theorizing that role theory links the structural dimensions of international politics and the agency perspective dominant in foreign policy analysis, which are mutually constitutive (Gaupp 1983: 13; Kirste & Maull 1996: 294; Raith 2006: 34; Thiess & Breuning 2012: 1) . Likewise, in good constructivist tradition, role conceptions are the result of a reflexive process: they are formed endogenously. They are a reflection of a state's identities and constitute, in other words, its foreign policy culture (Kirste & Maull 1996: 284) . Post-Second World War Germany and Japan, for instance, have been portrayed in role theoretical terms as nations pursuing the role of a "civilian power" (Maull 1990; Harnisch & Maull 2001) , whereas the European Union has been designated as a "normative power" (Manners 2002; Bengtsson & Elgström 2012) .
Foreign policy role conceptions have collective and individual dimensions (Gaupp 1983: 98, The only noteworthy exception is a Master's thesis submitted to Victoria University in Wellington, New ! 2 Jürgen Rüland -Democratizing Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN 112). The collective dimension denotes role conceptions which are shared by broad segments of the population and, hence, enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. They are the product of socialization and have been internalized by a society. They are part of the collective memory. These socially embedded collective role conceptions merge with the key policymakers' idiosyncrasies, their personalities, their own sets of norms and views of the external world, although if these individually-based role conceptions deviate too much from what the majority of the population perceives as a nation's role conceptions, the leaders' legitimacy is at stake and domestic role conflicts may emerge (Holsti 1970: 246; Kirste & Maull 1996: 287) . Hence, it can be assumed that most governments attempt to interpret and frame collective role conceptions in ways that are largely compatible with their own beliefs.
Role conceptions, by creating enduring patterns of foreign policy behavior, are thus the result of path dependencies. By pursuing certain roles in their foreign policies, states may influence the structure of the international system and provide stability to it. The norms on which foreign policy role conceptions are built highlight the expectations, values and ideals to which the norm bearer is committed and create a normative corridor determining state behavior, thereby ensuring a modicum of predictability of that state's behavior towards other international players.
However, it would be a mistake to reduce foreign policy roles to stable patterns. Such a view would imply too much rigidity for international politics. Often states are not committed to only one role; they may also champion multiple roles which complement each other or which reflect behavior in varying contexts (Holsti 1970: 277; Kirste & Maull 1996: 289-290) . These situational roles may even be contradictory, but in general do not challenge the state's identity as expressed in the overarching role conception. Moreover, in line with constructivist thinking and endogenous preference building, role concepts may be temporally specific and may change at critical junctures. Such critical junctures may be crises or external shocks; in any case major events which invalidate the expectations associated with the extant role conception (Legro 2000) . But -largely neglected by role theoreticians -role concepts may also change as a result of norm diffusion; due to political learning or lesson drawing, emulation and localization. Learning or lesson drawing (Rose 1993 ) is thereby defined as a change of beliefs, skills or procedures caused by the observation and interpretation of experience (Harnisch 2011: 10) . Emulation denotes the terminological or institutional adoption of foreign ideas, norms, world views or policies, without adopting the underlying values (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) and localization is a process of fusing new external and extant local ideas, norms and policies, frequently with the objective of maintaining at least the core of a "cognitive prior" (Acharya 2009 ).
Before beginning the empirical analysis, a few methodological issues need to be clarified. First, it should be noted that the study is qualitative and primarily rests on content analysis. Second, although role conceptions, especially in democracies, may be contested at the domestic level, it is governments which formulate and -even more importantly -apply them in the practical foreign policy process. I also assume that governments seek to highlight in multilateral global fora the identities by which they would like their country to be seen and judged by others, particularly fora in which they will be noticed by the maximum number of other states. Such a forum is the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). I thus analyzed the addresses made to the UNGA by Indonesian presidents and Indonesia's foreign ministers, which habitually occur every September when a new session year of the UNGA is inaugurated. I analyzed all documented addresses to the UNGA by Indonesian presidents, vice presidents and Indonesian foreign ministers from 1990 onward.
! 3 I am aware that the role conceptions governments propagate may vary according to audience. The most important audience, which may contest role conceptions, is domestic stakeholders. In order to acquiesce to local audiences and to maintain legitimacy, governments may thus highlight other roles in the domestic discourse than in international fora. If this is the case, it suggests the existence of intra-and inter-role conflicts. In recognition of such a divergence of propagated roles, I complemented the content analysis of speeches in the UNGA with speeches addressing domestic stakeholders. The latter included the annual foreign policy addresses of Indonesian foreign ministers and -although not completely accessible -state of the nation speeches by Indonesian presidents held on the eve of independence. Finally, as it is the objective of this paper to assess the significance of democracy in Indonesian foreign policy role conceptions after 1998, I also analyzed the opening speeches of President Susilo Bambang Yudyhoyono to the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) organized by the Indonesian government on an annual basis. Altogether, I analyzed forty-one speeches by top representatives of the Indonesian government; thirteen before democratization and twenty-eight after democratization. A summary of the sources I analyzed is exhibited in Table 1 . 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab UNGA 2000
Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda UNGA 2004 , 2005 , 2006 , 2008 Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa UNGA 2010 , 2011 Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa Annual Foreign Policy Address, Jakarta 2010 , 2011 , 2014 Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi Annual Foreign Policy Address, Jakarta
2015
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Jürgen Rüland -Democratizing Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN Coding of the speeches followed an inductive approach. It was inspired by the role conceptions identified by Holsti, but was open enough to identify additional roles which Holsti's and subsequent role theory analyses have failed to uncover. To scrutinize the impact of Indonesia's democratization on regional governance in ASEAN, I particularly draw from Indonesian debates about the ASEAN Charter (the quasi constitution of the regional grouping) and Indonesian efforts to influence this major attempt to modernize norms and procedures in ASEAN (Rüland 2014b ).
Democracy and Indonesian Role Conceptions Before 1998
The Soekarno Era: Advocate Against Colonialism and Imperialism
My examination of Indonesian leaders' UNGA addresses shows continuous modification of the country's foreign policy role conceptions over time. Initially, when President Soekarno addressed the UNGA in 1960, he championed only one major theme: Indonesia's role conception as an ardent advocate against colonialism. This anti-colonialism stressed national sovereignty, self-determination and independence as the most precious possessions of developing countries. Nationalism was the key norm fueling the long 2 struggle for independence and remains a crucial norm for maintaining and protecting this independence. But it is a nationalism that differs markedly from the Western type of nationalism. Soekarno depicted the nationalism of developing countries as a positive force equated with patriotism. It is the "great engine which drives and controls the country's international activities." Nationalism is, in Soekarno's words, "the great spring of liberty and the majestic inspiration for freedom." In Asia, Africa and Latin America, it "is a 3 liberating movement, a movement of protest against imperialism and colonialism, and a response to the oppression of chauvinist nationalism springing from Europe." The West, by contrast, "has prostituted and distorted nationalism." In the Western state system nationalism has thus degenerated to an "aggressive force, seeking national economic expansion and advantage. It was the grandparent of imperialism, whose father was capitalism." 4
However, a careful reading of Soekarno's speech, in which he positioned Indonesia as a country on the forefront against the scourge of mankind -the triad of colonialism, imperialism and capitalism -also shows that this role conception already bore the germs of a much more complex role conception that became pre-eminent in Indonesia's foreign policy identity in subsequent periods. One implicit consequence of the role conception propagated by Soekarno was that Indonesia demanded for itself a leadership role in international politics. Soekarno portrayed Indonesia as a vocal voice defending the interests of those countries that were still in the process of shedding the yoke of colonialism -like the Congo or Algeria -or those suffering from the imperialism the former Western colonial powers still exercised in many parts of the developing world by exploiting these new nations, prolonging social injustices and sustaining global inequalities. 5 Prototypical for this self-styled leadership role was the reference to the hosting of the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung. By implication, Indonesian leadership ambitions also involved the role conception of a country that is not only independent, but also active. In
United Nations General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, p. 280. Peaceful conduct of international relations also became a sub-theme of the foreign policy role conception Soekarno devised for Indonesia. But in 1960, it was clearly subordinated to the priority of the struggle against colonialism: only if colonialism and its concomitants imperialism and capitalism were defeated would peace come to international relations. Colonialism in its many guises was the main threat to world peace and the cause of tension and war.
Cooperation was viewed through the same lens. Cooperation wasg largely defined as SouthSouth cooperation, as an alliance in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Moreover, framed as internationalism in Indonesia's national doctrine of Pancasila, it was clearly to be distinguished from cosmopolitanism. Cooperation must be firmly based on 6 national sovereignty and was hence an intergovernmental concept. Cosmopolitanism, by contrast, was a norm that was a "denial of nationalism"; it was "anti-reality" for Soekarno.
Not unexpectedly, democracy also played a subordinate role in Soekarno's repository of foreign policy norms. The democracy Soekarno had in mind markedly differed from (liberal) Western types. "Democracy is not the monopoly or the invention of the Western social order," Soekarno insisted, it needed to be "modified to fit particular social conditions." Indonesia, he continued, had indeed developed its own democratic forms, which "have an international relevance and significance." Unlike liberal variants of 7 democracy, the "musyawarah dan mufakat" concept (deliberation and consensual decision making) enshrined in the Pancasila, Indonesia's state doctrine, knew neither majorities nor minorities. What Soekarno did not tell his audience is that the democracy he championed 8 was based on a romanticized and reactionary variant of Western organic state theory. Indonesian priyayi nationalists imported and localized it in an attempt to legitimize their claim to rule the country after independence (Reeve 1985; Simantunjak 1988; Bourchier 1999) . The organic state concept Soekarno propagated highlighted unity, power and authority -norms that in the process of nation building helped nationalist leaders to galvanize a highly diverse population for the cause of independence, but also allowed elites to construct narratives legitimizing their rule. Nevertheless, Soekarno was adamant in his belief that Indonesian leadership in international fora such as in Bandung showed that his conception of democracy worked and that, hence, it should also be adopted by the United Nations. Soekarno viewed the United Nations of his time as a product of the Western state 9 system; an organization which at its core was deeply undemocratic. Democratizing the UN 10 thus meant revising its bodies, in particular the Security Council, in a way that would truly reflect the changes that had occurred since the organization's inception in 1945. Concerning the UN, several arguments habitually re-occurred in their speeches. Foremost amongst these were demands for a re-calibration of the institutional relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council. They argued that the role of the General Assembly should be upgraded to make it the most significant body of the UN and the Security Council should become more accountable to the General Assembly. human rights concept based on collective developmental rights legitimized the Soeharto regime's developmental agenda and provided it with a justification for its blatant human rights violations seemingly committed for the sake of development.
While Indonesia adopted the role conception of an active advocate for the democratization of relations between nations, the references by the country's leading representatives to domestic democracy and human rights were largely defensive. They were subordinated to the overarching role conception of an "advocate for development" which Indonesia pursued during the New Order period. References to global socioeconomic development in all its facets -from poverty alleviation to the inequities of the international economy and debt problems -were pre-eminent in virtually all speeches. 26 But while the "development dividend" required a thorough restructuring of the 27 international economy -an objective Soekarno sought to achieve through struggle -, Indonesia under Soeharto built on international cooperation. References to cooperation, multilateralism, global governance, dialogue, friendship and partnership abound in the analyzed texts. Although Indonesia was a decisive advocate for South-South cooperation as leverage to change the unjust international economic order, the UN's "Agenda for 
Indonesian Role Conceptions in the Era Reformasi: Good Global Citizen and Democracy
In the immediate post-Soeharto years, Indonesia pursued inward-looking policies. The country struggled with the disastrous economic fallout from the Asian financial crisis, separatist movements, terrorist attacks and elite struggles over the future rules of the political game. Between 1998 and 2004, Indonesian leaders rarely addressed the UNGA. What they said was reflective of the fact that Indonesia was in search of new foreign policy role conceptions. However, this attitude changed completely after 2004, when the fledgling Indonesian democracy entered the consolidation stage and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became the first popularly elected Indonesian president.
While in his addresses Ali Alatas formulated the Indonesian foreign policy role conceptions more indirectly and cautiously, by highlighting the abstract norms and policies of multilateral organizations, in particular the UN, which Indonesia supports, Hassan was much more assertive by showcasing Indonesia as a case of best practices in both the domestic realm and the international arena. Hassan was convinced that "democracy, after all, is one of the most dominant ideas" in the twenty-first century which, by coincidence, is By celebrating at length Indonesia's achievements in the process of democratic transition, the conduct of free, fair and peaceful elections and unconditional respect for human rights in his first UNGA address, Hassan was already devising a role conception for Indonesia as an advocate of democracy. In his subsequent speeches, Hassan always highlighted Indonesia's progress towards a democratic order, thereby also mentioning Indonesia's bold decentralization reforms which transformed the country from one of the world's most centralized political regimes to one in which local governments enjoyed a high degree of political autonomy. 36 The domestic political change also encouraged Hassan to call even more assertively than Alatas for a democratization of international institutions, in particular the UN. While 37 many of his arguments echoed those raised earlier by Alatas, in his 2004 UNGA address Hassan openly demanded a permanent seat in the Security Council for Indonesia. While Alatas formulated general criteria on which a reform of the Security Council should be based, thereby implying that Indonesia fulfilled them, Hassan explicitly named criteria which in his view made Indonesia a serious contender for a permanent seat: Indonesia was the globe's "third largest democracy" -a rhetorical phrase henceforth used abundantly by Indonesian government representatives and in the Indonesian press -it was the world's fourth most populous country, and it possessed the world's largest Muslim population. 38 The fact that the Indonesia of the Era Reformasi has successfully amalgamated democracy, modernity and Islam is unique and distinguishes Indonesia from other candidates. 39 Highlighting the felicitous relationship between democracy and Islam also suggests that Indonesia's role conception emphasized the country's moderate Islamic identity more than it had in the past, thereby responding to the heightened significance that political Islam has achieved since President Soeharto's so-called opening policy (keterbukaan) in the early 1990s. Demands for a permanent seat in the Security Council unequivocally reflected Indonesia's increased self-confidence after its successful political transition and mastery of the Asian financial crisis. But they also demonstrated a view, held since the country's independence, that Indonesia is entitled to leadership (Weinstein 1976; Leifer 1983) . While previously leadership ambitions were based on the country's size and demographic characteristics, in the Era Reformasi they have been elevated to a normative plane, which definitely constitutes a novelty in Indonesian role conceptions. Interestingly, however, nowhere in the Indonesian leaders' speeches was reference made to a parliamentarization of the UN or the need to create a civil society chamber -demands which increasingly came to the fore in scholarly and political debates about democratizing international politics.
Under Hassan's successor Marty Natalegawa democracy continued to be a major determinant of Indonesia's foreign policy role conception. Marty also proudly referred to Marsudi, resumed the holding of foreign policy breakfasts. 43 However, it would be misleading to equate Indonesia's advocacy for democracy with the promotion of liberal Western types of democracy even during the Era Reformasi. Thus Indonesia cannot be attributed the status of a "normative power" (Acharya 2014: 9) without some reservation. This is shown by President Yudhoyono's opening speeches to the Bali Democracy Form (BDF) which were characterized by polyvalence, ambiguity and vagueness. While on the one hand alluding to liberal conceptualizations of democracy, he referred, on the other hand, to pre-reformasi notions of political order as expressed in the organicist and collectivist "musyawarah" and "mufakat" traditions, which are clearly at variance with liberal concepts of democracy. The relativist and contextual interpretation of democracy during the Soeharto era also reappears in a Yudhoyono speech in which he stated that many Asian countries have "adopted democracy, adapting it with Eastern values." The 44 same conclusion must be drawn from his suggestion that democracy is "something that must be constructed on the basis of a nation's own historical experience and cultural conditions" -or be "homegrown." shows that incorporating the expertise of non-state actors was not the prime objective of the government. Usually, the participants of the foreign policy breakfast meetings included actors who were generally supportive of the existing foreign policy. Interactions mainly concentrated on "socialization," in other words attempts to mobilize major social actors in support of government policies. What at first sight seemed to be genuine stakeholder participation in reality served transmission belt functions. "Participation in decisionmaking" and "participation in evaluation" were not the major thrust of these consultations, but rather state corporatist patterns of "participation in implementation" and "participation in benefits" (Cohen & Uphoff 1980; Rüland 2014a) . These vacillations in the concept of democracy suggest intra-role conflicts in the Indonesian foreign policy community.
While democracy still played a major part in Indonesia's foreign policy role conception after 2009, under Marty it was increasingly subordinated to Indonesian leadership claims. Certainly, the strong reference to Indonesia's democratic achievements under Hassan and the demands for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council also implied thinly veiled leadership ambitions, but the latter were more assertively articulated under Marty, who defined Indonesia as an emerging power with a regional and global role. Marty emphasized Indonesia's leadership role especially in his annual foreign policy addresses, with the obvious intention of satisfying the aspirations of an increasingly nationalistic public. Indonesia's regional leadership role focused in particular on ASEAN. The emphasis on initiatives during Indonesia's 2011 ASEAN chairmanship was pursued with the intention of giving further credence to these claims.
But the Indonesian government's ASEAN policies were challenged domestically. It was Rizal Sukma's widely shared call for a post-ASEAN policy, with its demand for greater 47 independence of Indonesia's foreign policy, which the Indonesian government could not ignore. Rizal likened ASEAN to a golden cage for Indonesia, restricting its options to pursue its national interests. He argued that the seemingly limited benefits of regional integration should persuade the Indonesian government to drop its long-held doctrine according to which ASEAN was the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. Instead, Indonesia should pursue a truly active foreign policy in the fora of the wider Asia-Pacific region and seek greater alignments with emerging global and regional powers, in particular the BRICS states. 48 In his UNGA addresses, Marty did not openly endorse Rizal's stridently nationalist creed about Indonesia's role in the world, but nevertheless felt compelled to give more weight to Indonesia's role conception of international leader. By using rhetorical figures such as "Indonesia initiated," "Indonesia launched" and "Indonesia pushed for," he highlighted Indonesia's agenda-setting roles, thereby subtly supporting leadership aspirations at home and the perceptions of foreign governments that Indonesia not only claims to play but indeed does play an important role in international affairs. Marty's speeches, portraying Indonesia as an extremely active player in international politics, thus tallied well with the public's neo-nationalist mood, which strongly sought a revitalization of the age-honored bebas-aktif doctrine.
Rizal Sukma in The Jakarta Post, 30 June 2009. 47 Ibid.
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Jürgen Rüland -Democratizing Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN Other role conceptions Indonesia emphasized under Hassan and Marty displayed even greater continuity. In the Era Reformasi Indonesia has also pursued the image of an advocate for peaceful conflict management as exemplified by its frequent participation in UN peace missions, the peaceful settlement of its own separatist conflicts (such as Aceh) and its 49 50 strong interest in disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. President 51 Yudhoyono's slogan of "a million friends and zero enemies" further underscores this objective (Borchers 2013: 19) . Moreover, Indonesia's role conception of peacemaker and bridge-builder became apparent in the government's frequent references to the country's 52 mediation in armed conflicts, usually conflicts involving Muslims as conflict parties. This signaled to the audience that Indonesia was not only capable of mediating conflicts among Muslims but also those between Muslim and non-Muslim countries.
Peaceful conflict management for Indonesia means that issues must be solved by diplomatic means, negotiations and institutional politics. In their foreign policy speeches, top Indonesian government representatives thus constantly referred to a plethora of institutions and international fora in which Indonesia was involved. For Indonesia, 53 multilateral cooperation continued to be the key to the solution of global and regional problems. More than his predecessor, and domestic criticism notwithstanding, Marty also approvingly referred to regional organizations, and in particular ASEAN, as significant platforms for cooperation. The Indonesian government further underscored its leadership ambitions by hosting many international conferences and events, suggesting that Indonesia was not only a responsible power, but also one in search of "soft power." Closely 54 connected with Indonesia's self-image as a peace builder and its attempts to generate soft power is its role conception as an organizer and facilitator of interfaith and intercultural dialogues. These activities portray Indonesia as an international force for moderation, an 55 56 attribute for which Indonesia competes with Malaysia, which has founded a Global Movement of Moderates (GMM) (Nguitragool & Rüland 2015: 118) .
Finally, Indonesia has also ceaselessly championed its role conception as an advocate of development in the Era Reformasi. Indonesian leaders have frequently framed global development as an objective in helping to redress global inequities, injustices and hence sources of violent conflict. Indonesia thus continued to act as an advocate for developing countries, in particular least developed countries (LDCs), and as a staunch supporter of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs there is indeed a major change in the Indonesian foreign policy role conception, but one year in office a trend becomes visible that the Jokowi government seems to rely more on extant foreign policy role than the Yudhoyono administration.
Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN
Indonesia's increased emphasis on democracy in its foreign policy role conception raises the question of to what extent this facilitated the democratization of ASEAN as a regional organization and of individual member countries. Did Indonesian democratization contribute to transforming ASEAN into a more people-oriented grouping? And did it facilitate democratic reforms in other ASEAN member countries? Or in role theory terms: Is there a gap between role conceptions and role performance? The answer to this question is that Indonesian actors, including the government, definitely tried to be major agents for change in ASEAN, but that the results did not tally well with Indonesia's leadership claims.
The first initiative was the Indonesian proposal for an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) prior to the Bali Summit in 2004. Although Indonesia succeeded in its attempts to incorporate seemingly liberal cosmopolitan norms such as democracy, respect for human rights, good governance and rule of law into the ASEAN Way, the region's repository of 60 cooperation norms, Indonesia had to accept that its ASEAN partners insisted on retaining older norms such as the sacrosanct non-interference norm. Yet it was clear that without discarding the non-interference norm, Indonesia would have little leverage to promote democracy and human rights in a more assertive way. Rizal Sukma, one of the intellectual architects of the ASEAN Security Community draft concept, later bitterly complained that most progressive ideas were eventually diluted in the negotiations preceding and during the Bali summit in 2003. For Indonesia, the Bali Concord II was thus a disappointment.
A few years later, in 2007, Indonesia succeeded in enshrining the new norms of the Bali Concord II in the ASEAN Charter. But again it had to compromise as the Charter still retained the sovereignty-based norms of the ASEAN Way. Yet it was mainly owing to Indonesia's insistence in the Charter negotiations that ASEAN members eventually agreed on forming a regional human rights mechanism. However, when the terms of reference for the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights came out after protracted On the ASEAN Way, see Rother (2012) .
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! 14 negotiations, Indonesia had to accept that it was a body which was able to promote, but not to protect human rights in the region. The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) enacted three years later in 2012 again had strong Indonesian backing, but was diluted once more by ASEAN's less democratic members. Upholding the contextualization of human rights by national history and culture, critics claim that the AHRD did not even match UN Declarations on human rights (Rüland 2013 ).
Other, more far-reaching demands of the Indonesian government, such as a shift from consensual to majority decision making and greater public involvement in ASEAN's decision making had virtually no chance. They were rejected by most other ASEAN member governments and did not find their way into the ASEAN Charter, except in the form of a somewhat terse statement that members committed themselves "to promote a peopleoriented ASEAN." However, the Indonesian government response was also lukewarm 61 when Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore and even the Philippines perverted the leadership-civil society dialogues at ASEAN summits by demanding that they, the governments -not the NGOs -determine who represents civil society in the meetings. When it chaired ASEAN in 2011, Indonesia organized a more credible leader-civil society dialogue, but was nevertheless criticized for narrowing down the exchange of views on health issues.
Indonesian non-state foreign policy stakeholders such as democracy and human rights activists among the country's legislators, the academe and civil society also criticized the feeble response of the Indonesian government to blatant human rights violations and obvious violations of the democracy norm of the ASEAN Charter. In the case of Myanmar, until 2010 widely considered a pariah state, Indonesia sought to subtly persuade the ruling military junta to initiate democratizing reforms. However, for the Indonesian critics of the junta, such as the legislators organized in the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar (AIPCM) and many human rights organizations, the pressure did not go far enough. Indonesia joined other ASEAN members to defend Myanmar in the UN: in Security Council and UNGA votes on human rights violations in Myanmar, Indonesia abstained. The Indonesian government also reacted half-heartedly to the coups in Thailand in 2006 and 2014. It did not respond to the political repression by the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia and it failed to impose pressure on the Laotian government after the disappearance of Magsaysay Award winner Sombath Somphone in 2012 (Weatherbee 2013: 33) . And it took until 2014, for the Indonesian government to decide to invite civil society to its Bali Democracy Forum, which several major NGOs subsequently boycotted due to the stagnation and even regression of Indonesian democracy -a view shared by many observers. 62 Altogether, this suggests that it is hardly possible to promote the democratization of regional governance and democracy in a region if there is not a critical mass of democratic members in a regional organization. As we have seen, Indonesia is the only country in ASEAN that was categorized as "free" (meaning fully democratic) by Freedom House from 2006 to 2013, before it too was downgraded to "partly free" in 2014. Indonesia itself was by no means the white knight that could credibly campaign for democracy and human rights in the region. The (temporary) abolition of direct local elections by the Indonesian legislature in 2014, the 2013 Law on Mass Organizations, the questionable treatment of (religious) minorities, the conscious weakening of the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK), the human rights violations in Papua and Indonesia's conditional support of the UN's responsibility to protect norms are all testimony to the fact that democracy is not fully See ASEAN Charter, Art. 1(13).
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The Jakarta Post, 9 October 2014. See also Mietzner (2012) .
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Jürgen Rüland -Democratizing Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN consolidated in Indonesia. Although Indonesia is by far the largest country in the region, its leadership ambitions and its reformist approach have been met with muted response from most other ASEAN member governments (Rüland 2009 ).
Conclusion
The examination of Indonesian foreign policy role conceptions has shown that some change, and in particular diversification, has taken place since the days of Soekarno. Under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, democracy became a major component of Indonesia's role conception, which changed from "advocate against colonialism and imperialism" under Soekarno, through "advocate of development" under Soeharto, to "good global citizen" under Yudhoyono. Democracy promotion became a major element in Indonesia's quest to accumulate "soft power" and to be recognized as a major voice in regional and global affairs. Indonesian democracy promotion thereby focused on several levels: the local level, by highlighting Indonesia's decentralization reform; the national level, by celebrating Indonesia's democratic transition; the regional level of ASEAN; and the international level by attempting to democratize executive multilateralism.
Surprisingly, however, despite democracy coming to the forefront of Indonesia's foreign policy role conception, the latter shows much continuity from the days of Soekarno. Democracy turned out to be a polyvalent concept which also incorporated authoritarian corporatist and organic traditions of political thought. Moreover, the democracy concept propagated by Indonesian leaders is heavily state-centric; as a result, promotion of nonstate actor participation has been lackluster. Democracy is thus another example of the continuous localization of external ideas by Indonesians (Acharya 2009 ). Democracy promotion also tallies well with and even strengthens Indonesian leadership ambitions.
Other parts of Indonesian foreign policy role conceptions also remain surprisingly constant: the advocacy role for developing countries and the concomitant Third Worldism, the relationship between peace and development, the strong penchant for multilateral cooperation of equal and sovereign nation states, and the moderate revisionism focusing on the current international order. Indonesia's identity as a moderate Islamic country that seeks to combine democracy, modernity and Islam and its identity as an economically advancing developing country, its rejection of revolutionary designs for changing the international order and its more integrative than distributive culture of negotiation in international fora indeed make it a bridge builder in international relations. Yet it is a bridge builder which pursues largely conservative concepts for democratizing governance beyond the nation state and which still lacks the power to change international politics according to the norms it propagates.
How then can change and continuity in Indonesia's foreign policy role conceptions be explained? Referring back to the theory section, the elevated position of democracy in the Indonesian role set is undoubtedly a result of political learning. Indonesian democratization is a response to the inability of the country's decades-long authoritarian regime to master the challenges of globalization as embodied in the Asian financial crisis. The latter was a crisis, an external shock, which according to theory of social change invalidated the expectations associated with the ideational orthodoxy -in Indonesia's case the New Orderand gave rise to democracy as a new governmental paradigm (Legro 2000) . Democratization was perceived as a government system which would eliminate rampant corruption, nepotism, social inequities and political repression -all those evils which were believed to ! 16
Jürgen Rüland -Democratizing Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN have triggered or at least deepened the Asian financial crisis. The blurring of the 63 democracy concept, on the other hand, its polyvalence, was the result of a localization process in which conservative elites sought to maintain core elements of the organicist "cognitive prior" (Acharya 2009 ) and to avoid divisive domestic role conflicts.
The surprising continuity of the other components of Indonesia's foreign policy role conceptions is, as predicted by role theory, a typical case of path dependency. It has to do with an unchanged perception by Indonesian leaders of the country's international environment. Frequently the speeches refer to the "uncertainties" of the global order, to the plethora of unresolved conflicts in the world. President Yudhoyono, for instance, likened the current geopolitical situation to a "turbulent sea," his frequently cited, but 64 also quite controversial doctrine of "a million friends and zero enemies" notwithstanding. This resumes a theme that can be traced throughout the Indonesian foreign policy discourse: the vulnerability and victimization of Indonesia which, despite enormous socioeconomic progress, is still a developing country, and for that matter a country with limited military capacities (Weinstein 1976) . The persistent reference to peaceful conflict resolution and the insistence on multilateral cooperation is thus a strategy of weaker countries to protect themselves from bullying by Great Powers. Soekarno's anti-colonialism lives on in Indonesia's Third Worldism, although the inherent revisionism is expressed in less assertive and more moderate and constructive terms. New is Indonesia's Islamic role conception, which is a tribute to the Islamic resurgence both internationally and, as a consequence, domestically.
Finally, the increasing diversification of Indonesia's role set is a response to the growing complexity of international politics under the aegis of globalization. This necessitates governments becoming functionally more specified, a process which forces them to play a rapidly increasing number of roles (Harnisch, Frank & Maull 2011: 260) . But it also reflects the growing capacities of the Indonesian state as a result of development, enabling the country to successfully take on a more complex foreign policy role conception. 
